Abstract. Unlike the standard notion of pseudorandom functions (PRF), a nonadaptive PRF is only required to be indistinguishable from a random function in the eyes of a non-adaptive distinguisher (i.e., one that prepares its oracle calls in advance). A recent line of research has studied the possibility of a direct construction of adaptive PRFs from non-adaptive ones, where direct means that the constructed adaptive PRF uses only few (ideally, constant number of) calls to the underlying non-adaptive PRF. Unfortunately, this study has only yielded negative results (e.g., Myers in Advances in Cryptology -EUROCRYPT 2004, pp. 189-206, 2004; Pietrzak in Advances in Cryptology -CRYPTO 2005, pp. 55-65, 2005.
Introduction
A pseudorandom function family (PRF), introduced by Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali [11] , cannot be distinguished from a family of truly random functions by an efficient distinguisher who is given an oracle access to a random member of the family. PRFs have an extremely important role in cryptography, allowing parties, which share a common secret key, to send secure messages, identify themselves and to authenticate messages [10, 13] . In addition, they have many other applications, essentially in any setting that requires random function provided as black-box. Different PRF constructions are known in the literature, whose security is based on different hardness assumption. Constructions relevant to this work are those based on the existence of pseudorandom generators [11] (and thus on the existence of one-way functions [12] ), and on, the so called, synthesizers [19] .
In this work we study the question of constructing (adaptive) PRFs from non-adaptive PRFs. The latter primitive is a (weaker) variant of the standard PRF we mentioned above, whose security is only guaranteed to hold against non-adaptive distinguishers (i.e., ones that "write" all their queries before the first oracle call). Since a non-adaptive PRF can be easily cast as a pseudorandom generator or as a synthesizer, [11, 19] tell us how to construct (adaptive) PRF from a non-adaptive one. If the input length of the underlying non-adaptive PRF is n, then the resulting length-preserving (i.e., mapping strings of length n to strings of the same length) (adaptive) PRF of both of these constructions makes Θ(n) calls to the underlying non-adaptive PRF. [11] was later improved to show that w(log n) sequential calls are sufficient (cf., [8, Sect. 3.8.4 
, Exe. 30]).
A recent line of work has tried to figure out whether more efficient reductions from adaptive to non-adaptive PRF's are likely to exist. In a sequence of works [5, 18, 20, 21] , it was shown that several "natural" approaches (e.g., composition or XORing members of the non-adaptive family with itself) are unlikely to work. See more in Sect. 1.3.
Our Result
We show that a simple composition of a non-adaptive PRF with an appropriate pairwise independent hash function, yields an adaptive PRF. To state our result more formally, we use the following definitions: a function family F is T = T (n)-adaptive PRF, if no distinguisher of running time at most T , can tell a random member of F from a random function with advantage larger than 1/T . The family F is T -non-adaptive PRF, if the above is only guarantee to hold against non-adaptive distinguishers. Given two function families F 1 and F 2 , we let F 1 • F 2 [resp., F 1 ⊕ F 2 ] be the function family whose members are all pairs (f, g) ∈ F 1 × F 2 , and the action (f, g)(x) is defined as f (g(x)) [resp., f (x) ⊕ g(x)]. We prove the following statements (see Sect. 3 for the formal statements). 1 Clearly F is p-non-adaptive PRF for any p ∈ poly, but applying Theorem 1.1 with T ∈ poly, does not yield a polynomially secure adaptive PRF.
We suggest two different solutions for handling polynomially secure PRFs. In Appendix A we observe (following Bellare [1] ) that a polynomially secure non-adaptive PRF is a T -non-adaptive PRF for some T ∈ n ω (1) . Since this T can be assumed without loss of generality to be a power of two, Theorem 1.1 yields a non-uniform (uses ω(1)-bit advice) polynomially secure adaptive PRF that makes a single call to the underlying non-adaptive PRF. Our second solution is to use the following "combiner", to construct a (uniform) adaptively secure PRF, which makes ω(1) parallel calls to the underlying non-adaptive PRF. Intuitively, the combiner apply Theorem 1.1 on the polynomially secure non-adaptive PRF for ω(1) times, with respect to T = n, n 2 , n 3 , . . . , n ω (1) , and finally XOR the outputs of these functions. Theorem 1.1 guarantees the security of at least one of the XORed functions, and thus security of the combiner follows.
Corollary 1.2 (Informal)
. Let F be a polynomially secure non-adaptive PRF with input length n, let H = {H n } n∈N be an efficient pairwise-independent length-preserving function family and let k(n) ∈ ω(1) be polynomial-time computable function.
For n ∈ N and i ∈ [n], let H i n be the function family
)} n∈N is a polynomially secure adaptive PRF.
Proof Idea
To prove Theorem 1.1 we first show that F • H is indistinguishable from Π • H, where Π being the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} (n) (letting (n) be F 's output length), and then conclude the proof by showing that Π •H is indistinguishable from Π . We use D to build a non-adaptive distinguisher D of running time p(n) · T (n), which distinguishes F from Π with advantage ε(n). Given an oracle access to a function φ, the distinguisher D φ (1 n ) first queries φ on all the elements of [T (n)] {0,1} n . Next it chooses at uniform h ∈ H, and uses the stored answers to its queries, to emulate
for some large enough p ∈ poly, makes nonadaptive queries, and distinguishes F from Π with advantage ε(n), the assumed security of F yields the result that ε(n) <
able from Π . Namely, even an unbounded distinguisher (that makes bounded number of calls) cannot distinguish between the families. The idea of the proof is fairly simple. Let D be an s-query algorithm trying to distinguish between Π • H and Π . We first note that the distinguishing advantage of D is bounded by its probability of finding a collision in a random φ ∈ Π • H (in case no collision occurs, φ's output is uniform). We next argue that in order to find a collision in φ, the distinguisher D gains nothing from being adaptive. Indeed, assuming that D found no collision until the ith call, then it has only learned that h does not collide on these first i queries. Therefore, a random (or even a constant) query as the (i + 1) call, has the same chance to yield a collision, as any other query has. Hence, we assume without loss of generality that D is non-adaptive, and use the pairwise independence of H to conclude that D's probability in finding a collision, and thus its distinguishing advantage, is bounded by s(n) 2 /2T (n).
Combining the above two observations, we conclude that an adaptive distinguisher whose running time is bounded by
from a random function) with an advantage better than
T (n))-adaptive PRF.
Related Work
Maurer and Pietrzak [15] were the first to consider the question of building adaptive PRFs from non-adaptive ones. They showed that in the information theoretic model, a self composition of a non-adaptive PRF does yield an adaptive PRF. 2 In contrast, the situation in the computational model (which we consider here) seems very different: Myers [18] proved that it is impossible to reprove the result of [15] via fully-black-box reductions. Pietrzak [20] showed that under the Decisional DiffieHellman (DDH) assumption, composition does not imply adaptive security. In [21] he showed that the existence of non-adaptive PRFs whose composition is not adaptively secure, yields the result that a key-agreement protocol exists. Finally, Cho, Lee, and Ostrovsky [5] generalized [21] by proving that composition of two non-adaptive PRFs is not adaptively secure iff a (uniform transcript) key agreement protocol exists. We mention that [5, 18, 20] , and in a sense also [15] , hold also with respect to XORing of the non-adaptive families.
A parallel line of work studied the notion and uses of weak PRFs (which are secure only against random quires). Damgård and Nielsen [6] showed how to use weak PRF directly in order to achieve private-key encryption, circumvent the need to first construct a PRF. Maurer and Sjödin [16] improved [6] 's construction and also gave a construction of PRF from weak PRF. Maurer and Tessaro [17] showed how to construct a PRF from an even weaker primitive-constant-query weak PRF. Recently, [7, 14] studied weak PRFs also in the context of message authentication codes.
In a very recent subsequent work, Berman et al. [3] used more sophisticated hashing technique to improve the result presented here. Specifically, [3] use the so called Cuckoo hashing to give an optimal version of Theorem 1.1-the resulting PRF is an O(T )-adaptive PRF (however, [3] does not achieve qualitative improvement over Corollary 1.2-it still requires ω(1) calls to the underlying non-adaptive polynomially secure PRF to get an adaptive polynomially secure PRF).
Preliminaries

Notations
All logarithms considered here are in base two. We let '||' denote string concatenation. We use calligraphic letters to denote sets, uppercase for random variables, and lowercase for values. For an integer t, we let [t] = {1, . . . , t}, and for a set S ⊆ {0, 1} * with |S| ≥ t, we let [t] S be the first t elements (in increasing lexicographic order) of S. We let poly denote the set all polynomials, and let PPTM denote the set of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (i.e., Turing machines) that run in strictly polynomial time.
for every p ∈ poly and large enough n.
Given a random variable X, we write X(x) to denote Pr[X = x], and write x ← X to indicate that x is selected according to X. Similarly, given a finite set S, we let s ← S denote that s is selected according to the uniform distribution on S. The statistical distance of two distributions P and Q over a finite set U , denoted as SD(P , Q), is defined as max
Ensemble of Function Families
Let F = {F n : D n → R n } n∈N stands for an ensemble of function families, where each f ∈ F n has domain D n and its range contained in R n . Such an ensemble is length preserving, if D n = R n = {0, 1} n for every n.
Definition 2.1 (Efficient function family ensembles). A function family ensemble
Samplable. F is samplable in polynomial time: there exists a PPTM that, given 1 n , outputs (the description of) a uniform element in F n . Efficient. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that given x ∈ {0, 1} n and (a description of) f ∈ F n , outputs f (x).
Operating on Function Families
Definition 2.2 (Composition of function families). Let
F 1 = {F 1 n : D 1 n → R 1 n } n∈N and F 2 = {F 2 n : D 2 n → R 2 n } n∈N be two ensembles of function families with R 1 n ⊆ D 2 n for every n. We define the composition of F 1 with F 2 as F 2 • F 1 = {F 2 n • F 1 n : D 1 n → R 2 n } n∈N , where F 2 n • F 1 n = {(f 2 , f 1 ) ∈ F 2 n × F 1 n }, and (f 2 , f 1 )(x) := f 2 (f 1 (x)).
Definition 2.3 (XOR of function families). Let
F 1 = {F 1 n : D 1 n → R 1 n } n∈N and F 2 = {F 2 n : D 2 n → R 2 n } n∈N be two ensembles of function families with R 1 n , R 2 n ⊆ {0, 1} (n) for every n. We define the XOR of F 1 with F 2 as F 2 F 1 = {F 2 n F 1 n : D 1 n ∩ D 2 n → {0, 1} (n) } n∈N , where F 2 n F 1 n = {(f 2 , f 1 ) ∈ F 2 n × F 1 n }, and (f 2 , f 1 )(x) := f 2 (x) ⊕ f 1 (x).
Pairwise Independent Hashing
Definition 2.4 (Pairwise independent families). A function family H = {h : D → R} is pairwise independent (with respect to D and R), if
For every ∈ poly, the existence of efficient pairwise independent family ensembles mapping strings of length n to strings of length (n) is well known [4] . In this paper we use efficient pairwise independent function family ensembles mapping strings of length n to the set [T (n)] {0,1} n , where T (n) ≤ 2 n and is without loss of generality a power of two. 3 Let H be an efficient length-preserving pairwise independent function family ensemble and assume that t (n) := log T (n) is polynomial-time computable. Then the function family H = { H n = { h : h ∈ H, h(x) = 0 n−t (n) ||h(x) 1,...,t (n) }}, is an efficient pairwise independent function family ensemble, mapping strings of length n to the set [T (n)] {0,1} n . n∈N is a (T (n), ε(n) )-adaptive PRF, if for every oracle-aided algorithm (distinguisher) D of running time T (n) and large enough n, we have
Pseudorandom Functions
Definition 2.5 (Pseudorandom functions). An efficient function family ensemble
where Π n is the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} (n) . If we limit D above to be non-adaptive (i.e., it has to write all his oracle calls before making the first call), then
The ensemble F is a T -adaptive PRF, if it is a (T , 1/T )-adaptive PRF according to the above definition. It is polynomially secure adaptive PRF (for short, adaptive PRF), if it is a p-adaptive PRF for every p ∈ poly. Finally, it is super-polynomially secure adaptive PRF, if it is a T -adaptive PRF for some T (n) ∈ n ω (1) . The same conventions are also used for non-adaptive PRFs.
Clearly, a super-polynomially secure PRF is also polynomially secure. In Appendix A we prove that the converse is also true: a polynomially secure PRF is also superpolynomially secure PRF.
Our Construction
In this section we present the main contribution of this paper-a direct construction of an adaptive pseudorandom function family from a non-adaptive one. 
Corollary 3.2. Let T , H and p be as in Theorem
Proof. Applying Theorem 3.1 with respect to s(n) =
To prove Theorem 3.1, we use the (non efficient) function family ensemble Π • H, where Π = Π (i.e., the ensemble of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} ), and = (n) is the output length of F . We first show that F • H is computationally indistinguishable from Π • H, and complete the proof by showing that Π • H is statistically indistinguishable from Π .
F • H is Computationally Indistinguishable from Π • H
Lemma 3.3. Let T , F , H and p be as in Theorem 3.1. Then for every oracle-aided distinguisher D of running time T (n), there exists a non-adaptive oracle-aided distinguisher D of running time p(n) · T (n) with
for every n ∈ N, where Π n is the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} (n) .
In particular, the pseudorandomness of F yields the result that F • H is computationally indistinguishable from the ensemble Π • H by an adaptive distinguisher of running time T .
Proof. The distinguisher D is defined as follows:
Algorithm 3.4 ( D).
Input: 1 n . Oracle: a function φ over {0, 1} n . 
Compute φ(x) for every
x ∈ [T (n)] {0,1} n . 2. Set g = φ • h,
Note that D makes T (n) non-adaptive queries to φ, and it can be implemented to run in time e T (n) + e H (n) + T (n) + e H (n)T (n) ≤ p(n)T (n).
We conclude the proof by observing that in case φ is uniformly drawn from F n , the emulation of D done in D φ is identical to a random execution of D g with g ← F n • H n . Similarly, in case φ is uniformly drawn from Π n , the emulation is identical to a random execution of D π with π ← Π n • H n .
Π • H is Statistically Indistinguishable from Π
The following lemma is commonly used for proving the security of hash-based MACs (cf., [9, Proposition 6.3.6] ), yet for completeness we give a full proof below. Lemma 3.5. Let n, T be integers with T ≤ 2 n , and let H be a pairwise independent function family mapping string of length n to [T ] {0,1} n . Let D be an (unbounded) s-query oracle-aided algorithm (i.e., making at most s oracle queries), then
where Π is the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} (for some ∈ N).
Proof. We assume for simplicity that D is deterministic (the reduction to the randomized case is standard) and makes exactly s valid (i.e., inside {0, 1} n ) distinct queries, and let Ω = ({0, 1} ) s . Consider the following random process:
Algorithm 3.6. 
Emulate
. , a s ).
Let A, Q, A , Q and H be the (jointly distributed) random variables induced by the values of q, a, q , a , and h, respectively, in a random execution of the above process. It is not hard to verify that A is distributed the same as the oracle answers in a random execution of D π with π ← Π , and that A is distributed the same as the oracle answers in a random execution of D g with g ← Π • H. Hence, for proving Lemma 3.5, it suffices to bound the statistical distance between A and A .
Let Coll be the event that H (
Since the queries and answers in both emulations of Algorithm 3.6 are the same until a collision with respect to H occurs, it follows that
On the other hand, since H is chosen after Q is set, the pairwise independent of H yields the result that
and therefore
Putting It Together
We are now finally ready to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let D be an oracle-aided algorithm of running time s with s(n) < T (n). Claim 3.3 yields the result that
for large enough n, where Lemma 3.5 yields the result that
for every n ∈ N. Hence, the triangle inequality yields the result that
for large enough n, as requested.
Handling Unknown Security
Corollary 3.2 is useful when the function T , which determines the security of the underlying non-adaptive PRF, is efficiently computable (or when considering non-uniform PRF constructions, see Sect. 1.1) and known at construction time. In this section we show how to handle the case where T is not known at construction time, and the case of polynomially secure non-adaptive PRF. We use the following PRF "combiner". 
Corollary 3.8. Let F be a T -non-adaptive PRF sampled and evaluated in time
e F ∈ poly, let H be an efficient length-preserving pairwise independent function family ensemble sampled and evaluated in time e H ∈ poly, and let
Then for every integer function t computable in time e t ∈ poly, with t (n) ∈ I(n) and
Before proving the corollary, let us first use it for constructing an adaptive PRF from a non-adaptive PRF whose security is not known at construction time. The resulting PRF makes logarithmic number of calls to the underlying non-adaptive PRF, and assuming the non-adaptive PRF is T -non-adaptive PRF, the resulting PRF is 6 
√
T -adaptive PRF. Proof. For n ∈ N let t (n) = max{i ∈ I(n) : 2 i ≤ T (n)}. Note that in order to compute t, it is suffice to compute T . Moreover, since every element in I(n) is the square of its predecessor, it follows that T (n) ≥ 2 t (n) ≥ √ T (n) for every n ∈ N. Corollary 3.8 yields the result that G is (
Corollary 3.9. Let F be a function family, let H be an efficient length-preserving pairwise independent function family ensemble and let I(n)
Proof of Corollary 3.8. It is easy to see that G is efficient, so it is left to argue for its security. In the following we assume for simplicity that the evaluation time of 2 n on input n ∈ N is bounded by n. Let t be an integer function computable in time e t with t (n) ∈ I(n) and 2 t (n) ≤ T (n)/p(n) for every n ≥ n * ≥ 0. It follows that
n } n∈N is an efficient pairwise independent function family ensemble with evaluation and sampling time e H t (n) ≤ e H (n) + e t (n). Moreover, let T * (n) = 2 t (n) , and note that T * (n) can be computed in time e T * (n) ≤ e t (n)
Assume towards a contradiction that there exists an oracle-aided distinguisher D that runs in time T (n) = 3 √ 2 t (n) /(q(n) · e t (n)) and
for infinitely many n's. We use the following distinguisher for breaking the pseudorandomness of F • H t :
Algorithm 3.10 ( D).
Input: 1 n . Oracle: a function φ over {0, 1} n .
For every
Note that D can be implemented to run in time
for every n ≥ n * . In particular, Sect. 3 yields the result that
for infinitely many n's, in contradiction to the pseudorandomness of F • H t proven above.
Polynomial Security
Corollary 3.9 immediately yields a construction of a polynomially secure adaptive PRF from a polynomially secure non-adaptive one. 4 The resulting PRF, however, makes logarithmic number of calls to the underlying non-adaptive PRF. Below we show how to construct a polynomially secure adaptive PRF that makes only ω(1) such calls. Proof. We show that G is r-adaptive PRF for every r ∈ poly. In the following we assume for simplicity that the evaluation time of a polynomial and of a base two logarithm on input n ∈ N, is bounded by n (even for short inputs). Fix c T ∈ N to be determined by the analysis and let T (n) = n c T (note that F is T -non-adaptive PRF). Let e F and e H be bounds on the sampling and evaluation time of F and H respectively. Let I(n) := { log n , 2 · log n , . . . , k(n) · log n } and let e I be a bound on the evaluation time of I(n). Let p(n) = n c p ≥ 4n + 2e H and let q(n) = n c q ≥ k(n)(e I (n) + e H (n) + e F (n)) (i.e., q bounds the evaluating and sampling time of k, I, H and F ). Finally, let t (n) = (c T − c p ) · log n .
For large enough n we have (1) t (n) ∈ I(n), (2) 2 t (n) ≤ T (n)/p(n) and (3) the evaluation time of t (n) is at most n, and thus p(n) ≥ n + 3e t (n) + 2e H (n) (i.e., p bounds the evaluating and sampling time of 2 t (n) and H). Hence, Corollary 3.8 yields the result that G is an (n (c T −c p )/3−c q −1 )-adaptive PRF. Taking c T = 3(c r + c q + 1) + c p , for a fixed c r ∈ N, yields the result that G is an n c r -adaptive PRF.
and let T (n) = n t (n) . Claim A.3 states that t is unbounded and non-decreasing.
Let A be a T -time algorithm, and let i A be the first integer such that A ∈ S i A . By Claim A.3 ∃n * ∈ N such that t (n) > i A for every n ≥ n * . Fix n ≥ n * . Since A ∈ S t (n) , we have v(A t (n) , n) < 1/n t (n) = 1/T (n).
In addition, since A is of running time T , the second property of v yields the result that v(A, n) = v(A t (n) , n), and therefore v(A, n) < 1/T (n). Claim A.3. The function t is unbounded and non-decreasing.
Proof. To see that t is unbounded, fix i ∈ N, and for each A ∈ S i , let n A be the first integer such that v(A i , n) < 1/n i for every n ≥ n A (such n A exists by the first property of v), and let n i = max{n A : A ∈ S i } ∪ {i}. It follows that i ∈ [n i ] and that v(A i , n) < 1/n i for every n ≥ n i and A ∈ S i , yielding that t (n i ) ≥ i.
Intuitively, t is non-decreasing since once an algorithm is taken into consideration in I(n * ), for some n * ∈ N, it will be taken into consideration in I(n) for any n > n * . Fix n * ∈ N. To formally argue the above we show that t (n) ≥ t * = t (n * ) for every n > n * . The definition of t yields the result that v(A t * , k) ≤ 1/k t * for every A ∈ S t * and k ≥ n * . It immediately follows that v(A t * , k) ≤ 1/k t * for every A ∈ S t * and k ≥ n > n * . Hence, t * ∈ I(n), and thus t (n) ≥ t * .
A.1. Non-uniform Security
Theorem A.1 holds only for uniform algorithms (i.e., Turing machines). Here we prove a similar result for the non-uniform case (i.e., polynomially bounded circuits). In the following we consider adversaries that are families of circuits, denoted with A = {A n } n∈N . A circuit A is of size (at most) s, if A has at most s gates. Similarly, a circuit family A = {A n } n∈N is of size s, here s is a function, if A n is of size s(n) for every n ∈ N. The family A is polynomially bounded, if it is of size p for some p ∈ poly.
Theorem A.4. Let S be the set of all circuits and let v : S → [0, 1] 6 be a function with v(A n ) = neg(n) for every oracle-aided polynomially bounded circuit family A = {A n } n∈N . Then there exists a non-decreasing integer function T (n) ∈ n ω (1) and n * ∈ N, such that v(A n ) ≤ 1/T (n) for every circuit family A = {A n } n∈N of size T and n ≥ n * .
Proof. We use the following approach (adopted from [1] ): for integer pair (n, s), let C n,s be the set of all n-input, s-size circuits. Fix B n,s ∈ C n,s with v(B n,s ) ≥ v(C) for all C ∈ C n,s (note that B n,s is well defined since C n,s is finite). For i ∈ N, let B i = {B n,n i } n∈N and let I(n) = {0} ∪ {i ∈ [n]: ∀k ≥ n : v(B k,k i ) < 1/k i }. Namely, for every i ∈ I(n) and k ≥ n, the "success" of any circuit family of size k i is bounded by 1/k i . Let t (n) = max I(n) and let T (n) = n t (n) . Claim A.5 states that t is a non-decreasing unbounded integer function. Hence, to complete the proof, it is left to show that there 6 In the uniform case the second parameter of v was used to represent the length of the input given to the algorithm. In contrast, in the non-uniform case, a circuit can only receive a single input length, and there is no need to give the input length as a parameter. Thus v's domain is restricted only to S.
exists n * ∈ N such that v(A n ) ≤ 1/T (n) for every circuit family A = {A n } of size T and n ≥ n * .
Indeed, let A = {A n } n∈N be a circuit family of size T , let n * ∈ N be such that t (n * ) ≥ 1 (such n * is guaranteed to exist by Claim A.5) and fix n ≥ n * . The definition of t yields the result that v(B n,n t(n) ) < 1/n t (n) = 1/T (n). Finally, the definition of B n,n t(n) yields the result that v(A n ) ≤ v(B n,n t(n) ), and therefore v(A n ) ≤ 1/T (n).
Claim A.5. The function t is a non-decreasing unbounded integer function.
Proof. To see that t is unbounded, we fix i ∈ N and show that ∃n ∈ N : t (n) ≥ i. Consider the circuit family B i , let n B i be the first integer such that v(B n,n i ) < 1/n i for every n ≥ n B i (note that such n B i exists by the property of v) and let n i = max{n B i , i}. It follows that i ∈ [n i ] and that v(B n,n i ) < 1/n i for every n ≥ n i , yielding that t (n i ) ≥ i.
To see that t is non-decreasing, we fix n * ∈ N, and show that t (n) ≥ t * = t (n * ) for every n > n * . The definition of t yields the result that v(B k,k t * ) < 1/k t * for every k ≥ n * . It immediately follows that v(B k,k t * ) < 1/k t * for every k ≥ n > n * . Hence, t * ∈ I(n), and thus t (n) ≥ t * .
